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Abstract—The contemporary literature on cloud resource allocation is mostly focused on studying the interactions between customers
and cloud managers. Nevertheless, the recent growth in the customers’ demands and the emergence of private cloud providers (CPs)
entice the cloud managers to rent extra resources from the CPs so as to handle their backlogged tasks and attract more customers.
This also makes studying the interactions between the cloud managers and the CPs essential. In this paper, we investigate both of the
mentioned interactions. For the interactions between customers and cloud managers, we adopt the options-based sequential auctions
(OBSAs) to the cloud resource allocation paradigm. As compared to existing works, our framework can handle customers with
heterogeneous demands, provide truthfulness as the dominant strategy, enjoy a simple winner determination, and preclude the
delayed entrance issue. We also provide the performance analysis of the OBSAs, which is among the first in literature. For the
interactions between cloud managers and CPs, we propose an auction-based scheme for resource gathering. Through incorporating
the offered prices, we capture the heterogeneous desires of the CPs in leasing their resources. We conduct a comprehensive
mathematical analysis of the two markets and identify the bidding strategy of the cloud managers.
Index Terms—Auction theory, cloud of clouds networks, sequential auctions, options-based sequential auctions, proxy agent, cloud
resource allocation, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, dynamic markets
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MODERN society relies crucially on efficient processingof the massive amount of data collected from a va-
riety of sources such as customers’ information, wireless
sensors, and statistical polls, for which cloud computing
is a natural platform. Various cloud-based services are of-
fered by different commercial companies such as Microsoft
Azure [2], Google Cloud [3], and Amazon EC2 [4]. Many
companies are also anticipated to join this profitable mar-
ket by offering cloud services. The recent growth in the
customers’ demands has motivated the idea of sharing
the resources in cloud networks [5], where cloud owners
can temporarily rent spare resources from one another to
provide better services to the customers. It is anticipated
that in the near future, large companies may dominate the
entire cloud computing market by renting cloud resources
from smaller or private companies. In that case, one of the
most suitable candidates for modeling the corresponding
cloud resource allocation may be the auction mechanism
due to its simplicity, versatility, and a good match with the
request and response paradigm in cloud networks. Recently,
Amazon Spot Instances is introduced as a simple auction-
based framework for resource allocation, where users can
bid for their requested cloud servers [6].
1.1 Related works
Auction theory provides a solid mathematical foundation
for resource allocation among a set of resource-seeking
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customers and a set of resource providers. Hence, there
exists a body of literature studying auction-based resource
allocation in other contexts such as spectrum sharing in
cognitive radio networks [7], [8], [9], [10], [11].
In modern cloud networks, cloud servers can be clas-
sified into different types according to their hardware and
software configurations. Also, a bundle of cloud servers of
different types may be required to meet the heterogeneous
user demands simultaneously. Hence, earlier frameworks
(e.g., [12]) that only consider one type of cloud servers
and one type of tasks cannot well capture the reality of
the market. On the other hand, cloud servers often switch
between busy and idle states repeatedly and customers may
join and leave the market at will. To capture this dynamism,
it is more desirable to hold sequential auctions instead of
a single-round auction. One simple approach is to hold a
sequence of single-round auctions over time. However, as
mentioned in [13], single-round truthful auctions usually
lose the truthfulness property when they are extended to
sequential auctions. The truthfulness property ensures that
customers cannot get higher rewards by manipulating their
true valuations for the goods. This consideration motivates
us to go beyond the existing works on single-round auction
(e.g., [14], [15], [16], [17]), and to seek truthful sequential
auction solutions.
The most related works to ours are [18], [19], [20],
[21], [22]. In [18], a novel bidding language is introduced
based on categorizing the users into different groups with
respect to their characteristics. Users are partitioned into
three groups: job-oriented users, resource-aggressive users,
and resource-aggressive users with time-invariant capacity
requirements. A truthful online cloud auction mechanism
is introduced on top of this bidding language. However,
the original model only considers one type of the cloud
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2servers. The authors have extended their proposed frame-
work to the case with multiple types of tasks and servers
in [19]. However, the resulting model requires calculating
a complex payment function for each arriving task and
obtaining the allocation strategy by solving an optimization
problem. These issues become a concern when handling
real-time resource allocation in cloud networks with a large
task arrival rate.
In order to model the multiple types of cloud servers and
customers with heterogeneous demands, current literature
has mainly focused on utilizing the combinatorial auctions
for cloud resource allocation. Although combinatorial auc-
tions can guarantee some favorable properties (such as
truthfulness) in theory, it is well-known that determining
the winner and its payment in combinatorial auctions is
NP-hard, which renders them impractical in dynamic mar-
kets with real-time demands such as cloud networks. Also,
these auctions are inherently designed for one-round sell-
ing. These issues of combinatorial auctions have promoted
further research (e.g. [20], [21]) on solving winner determi-
nation using simpler approximation methods or extending
them to sequential combinatorial auctions. In [20], the au-
thors proposed a truthful mechanism for sequential com-
binatorial auctions. In this framework, besides complicated
winner determination and payment identification process,
when a user’s task requires a bundle of cloud resources
for more than one unit of time, the user has to bid in
multiple rounds of auctions. This fact makes the framework
inapplicable when users require uninterruptible processing
of their tasks. In [21], the interactions between customers
and cloud providers is modeled as an online combinatorial
auction. The model of that work captures multiple types
of cloud servers and heterogeneity of customers’ demands.
Also, it considers a sequential style of auction, in which win-
ner determination is translated into a series of one-round
optimization problems. A truthful mechanism of selling is
examined; and an approximate algorithm is proposed for
one-round optimization. However, similar to [19], the need
for solving multiple optimization problems using empirical
methods in each round of the auction makes the framework
complicated and computationally intensive. All of the afore-
mentioned works and most of the contemporary literature
focus on modeling the interactions between cloud managers
and customers, whereas the resource gathering process
for cloud managers is largely ignored. In the pioneering
work [22], a general framework for intercloud networks is
presented where the interactions between users and cloud
providers is modeled by many-to-many auctions. After-
ward, the interactions between cloud providers is modeled
by a coalition game in which the cloud providers borrow re-
sources from each other to fulfill their customers’ demands.
This work is among the first to consider the interactions both
between the customers and cloud providers, and among
the cloud providers themselves; unfortunately, users with
bundle demands were not considered. Furthermore, one of
the main challenges in dynamic cloud resource allocation
scheme neglected in most of the mentioned works is the
delayed entrance problem. This problem arises when a user
delays its entrance into the market when he has some
side-information about the future dynamics of the market.
Assume that in a sequential combinatorial auction, some
users become aware that by waiting for some period of
time, the cloud resources can be obtained at lower prices. In
this scenario, all the users with side-information postpone
their entrance into the market. In a large-scale market, this
circumstance leads to a burst of arrival, and thus an unstable
market.
In summary, existing literature on modeling the inter-
actions between the cloud managers and customers has at
least one of the following four limitations: (i) incapability of
handling customers’ heterogeneous demands that require a
bundle of different types of servers, (ii) missing the truth-
fulness property, (iii) requiring prohibitive computation for
winner and payment determination, and (iv) susceptible to
the delayed entrance issue. These issues will be addressed
in our work. Also, to the best of our knowledge, our work
is among the first to leverage auction theory to study the
interactions among the public cloud managers and private
cloud providers (CPs), which better captures the selfishness
of the CPs considering their willingness to resource sharing
captured by their offered prices.
1.2 Novelty and Contributions
To address the limitations of the existing works mentioned
in subsection 1.1, a novel two-stage auction framework is
proposed in this work to capture the interactions among
(a) customers and cloud managers, and (b) cloud managers
and CPs. Specifically, we consider cloud of clouds networks
(CCNs) consisting of heterogeneous cloud servers and cus-
tomers with different demands. There exists a CCN manager
in charge of handling the resources of each CCN. The CCN
managers are interested in renting servers from CPs to en-
large their pool of resources so as to attract more customers
and better handle their real-time demands. The first stage
of the proposed framework is inspired by the options-based
sequential auctions (OBSAs) [23] and models the interac-
tions between customers and CCN managers, in which each
customer endeavors to obtain his/her demanded resources
from a CCN.1 To the best of our knowledge, we are (among)
the first to leverage OBSAs to address the major limitations
of existing works on dynamic cloud networks.2 In addition,
we provided the corresponding performance analysis based
on a novel Markov chain modeling, which is new to exist-
ing studies in the relevant literature. The second stage of
the proposed framework describes the interactions between
multiple CCN managers and multiple CPs, in which CCN
managers compete to obtain resources from CPs. For this
stage, we introduce a novel model consisting of two parallel
markets for gathering cloud resources: flat-price market and
auction-based market, to better capture the selfishness of the
private CPs (by incorporating offered prices) as compared
to the existing models.3 We also provide a comprehensive
analysis for these markets using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation and derive the bidding strategy of the CCN man-
agers with respect to their inherent characteristics in a stable
market setting.
1. In this study, we consider the infrastructure as a service (IaaS) form
of cloud computing.
2. The truthfulness property is guaranteed in the second-price
options-based sequential auctions.
3. These markets may be viewed as the counterparts of the day-ahead
and real-time markets in smart grids [24].
3CP 1
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Figure 1: Market model.
Structure of the paper: The system model is introduced
in Section 2. The interactions between the customers and
the CCN managers is modeled in Section 3. Section 4 is
devoted to the analysis of OBSAs. The interactions between
the CPs and the CCN managers is modeled and analyzed
in Section 5. Simulation results are presented in Section 6.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and provides some
possible future directions.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
A CCN consists of multiple cloud servers with different
processing capabilities; some of them are more desirable for
GPU processing, while the others are more suitable for real-
time database analysis and parallel processing. In addition
to their core servers, CCNs can rent servers from CPs to
process their backlogged tasks and to serve more customers.
CPs are small cloud retailers who lease their extra computa-
tional resources to CCNs for profit. Customers with multiple
heterogeneous demands may join the CCN at will and
require multiple types of servers simultaneously. Inspired
by [22], [23], proxy agents (PA) are incorporated into our
model as trusted mediators between the customers and the
corresponding CCN. Each customer sends its demands to an
idle PA; subsequently, the PA attempts to fulfill the demands
with the available resources of a CCN. Each CCN operates
under the control of a CCN manager who interacts with CPs
and PAs.
Due to the variety in the task types and individual prior-
ities, customers may have disparate preferences for different
(combination of) servers, which is assumed known to their
corresponding PAs. In this paradigm, the PAs and the CCN
managers employ a common bidding language that reflects
the customers’ demands and valuations. Nevertheless, the
discussion of the bidding language is beyond the scope of
this paper. An interested reader is referred to [25], [26] and
references therein for more details.
In this work, we introduce a framework in which CCN
managers rent extra servers from CPs by participating in
one of the two parallel markets: the flat-price market and the
auction-based market. In the flat-price market, the CPs offer
their servers at a fixed price. In the auction-based market,
CPs provide their servers along with their offered prices
(i.e., the least expected price to lend the corresponding
servers), where the CCN managers bid in a sequence of
auctions to obtain the servers while satisfying the CPs’
offered prices. The flat-price market is more suitable for
leasing the servers with long idle periods. In this case, since
a CP does not need to utilize the server in the near future, he
aims to lease the server with a constant high price. However,
the auction-based market is more favorable for servers with
a short idle period. In this case, the CP may need its servers
in a near future for itself. Hence, CPs compete with each
other by offering lower prices of their servers so as to lease
them faster. Similarly, a CCN manager who requires the
resource immediately and needs to rent it for a long period
tends to join the flat-price market, while the rest of the
CCN managers participate in the auction-based market. As
can be seen from Figure 1, the proposed model involves
two stages for gathering and selling the resources. The first
stage captures the interactions between the PAs and the
CCN managers, while the second represents the interactions
between the CCN managers and the CPs. In the following,
we will introduce and analyze these two stages in order.
3 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CCN MANAGERS AND
PAS: OPTIONS-BASED SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
The main purpose of utilizing an auction is to sell goods
when there is more than one interested buyers. In sequential
auction, the seller holds consecutive auctions for selling
goods. Since the seller can adjust the time interval between
the consecutive auctions, sequential auctions are suitable for
the following scenarios: (i) availability of the goods varies
over time, which means the goods may not be available
in some of the time instances; (ii) the buyers arrive at the
market at different times, which requires the seller to wait
for some period of time before the number of buyers exceeds
a threshold to guarantee a certain profit. Considering these
facts, sequential auction is arguably the most suitable type
of auctions for leasing the cloud servers to the PAs.
Classic first-price and second-price sequential auctions
have been studied in the literature [27], [28]. Nevertheless,
one of the main drawbacks of these auctions is the lack of
a dominant strategy that can accommodate heterogeneous
demands of buyers when customers face multiple sequential
auctions. For example, consider the following two situa-
tions:
1) A buyer with a limited budget and heterogeneous
demands requires goods from either of the two
sequential auctions but not from both.
2) A buyer with a limited budget requires goods from
both sequential auctions simultaneously.
In both cases, a buyer has no dominant strategy for splitting
the budget between multiple sequential auctions [23]. For
the interactions between PAs and CCN managers, consid-
ering PAs as buyers, CCN managers as sellers, and each
server as a good, holding a separate sequential auction
for each type of servers will lead to the situations in the
above-mentioned examples, which makes classic sequential
auctions inapplicable. Another main concern of applying the
classic sequential auctions and the combinatorial auctions
to our context is the delayed entrance issue, where PAs
may intentionally delay their entrance to the market for a
better price. This phenomenon leads to an undesired burst
of arrivals into the market and causes market instability.
4Algorithm 1: Price matching process for the first-price
options-based sequential auction
input : Current price that the PA has to pay when the current
auction begins, entering and patience time of the winner
PA (Pcur ,tent,tpat), clock time (T ), winner of the
current auction’s bid (bw)
output: Price that the PA has to pay (Pout(T ))
t←− tent + tpat
Pout(T )←− Pcur
if (t ≥ T and bw < Pcur) then
Pcur ←− bw
end
Pout(T )←− Pcur
The aforementioned concerns suggests a need for an
auction mechanism that can: (i) capture the dynamism of the
market with its sequential style of holding; (ii) enjoy truth-
fulness as the dominant strategy to ensure that PAs cannot
make more profit by manipulating their true valuations;
and (iii) resolve the delayed entrance issue. To this end,
we propose utilizing the options-based sequential auction
(OBSA) [23] in our study. Besides enjoying all the above-
motioned characteristics, OBSA leads to more trust between
bidders and an auctioneer, and thus results in a higher long-
term profit for the auctioneer. Moreover, OBSAs have simple
implementation and admit fast winner recognition.
Basically, OBSAs are classic sequential auctions rein-
forced with the options-based property. Consider a classic
sequential auction with first- or second-price backbone in
our context. In the first- (second-)price scenario, the PA with
the highest bid is the winner who is then required to make a
payment equal to his (the second highest) bid. Considering
OBSAs in our context, the options-based property guaran-
tees the least payment for winner PAs during their patience
time, where the patience time is referred to as the time win-
dow in which the PA can wait before utilizing its obtained
resources. Hence, this property eliminates the sensitivity of
the PAs’ payment to the time of winning an auction. In
OBSAs, winner PAs are granted the opportunity to collect
all of their demanded resources from the CCN resource
pool before getting charged. The options-based property
manifests itself through the price matching process, which
is the main difference between OBSAs and classic sequential
auctions. In [23], OBSAs with second-price backbone are
proposed without mathematical analysis. In this work, we
introduce them to the cloud-related literature, adapt them
to the cloud resource allocation scenario, and provide math-
ematical analysis identifying multiple performance metrics
of interest. We also present the OBSAs with the first-price
backbone, which builds the foundation of analysis for the
OBSAs with the second-price backbone.
3.1 First- and Second-Price OBSAs and PA’s Role
Without loss of generality, we investigate the interactions
between multiple PAs and a CCN manager (for one CCN)
in the following. Note that we consider sealed bidding
procedure, in which PAs do not communicate with each
other and have no information about each others’ bid. A
CCN manager holds OBSAs with either the first-price or
the second-price backbones for its possessed cloud servers,
where a separate sequence of auctions is offered for each
type of servers. The first- and second-price OBSAs and the
PA’s corresponding actions are discussed in the following:
Algorithm 2: Price matching process for the second-price
options-based sequential auction
input : Current price that the PA has to pay when the current
auction begins, entering and patience time of the winner PA
(Pcur ,tent,tpat), stored bumped PA’s ID in this PA’s
memory (IDmem), clock time (T ), bid and ID of the current
auction’s winner (bw ,IDw), bid and ID of the current
auction’s bumped PA (bbumped,IDbumped)
output: Price that the PA has to pay (Pout(T ))
t←− tent + tpat
Pout(T )←− Pcur
if (t ≥ T ) then
if (IDmem 6= Null) then
if IDw = IDmem then
if bbumped < Pcur then
IDmem ←− IDbumped
Pcur ←− bbumped
end
else
if bw < Pcur then
IDmem ←− Null
Pcur ←− bw
end
end
else
if bw < Pcur then
Pcur ←− bw
end
end
end
Pout(T )←− Pcur
1) Calculating the bid for each of the auctions of inter-
est: The PA submits a bid equal to the customer’s maximum
marginal value for suitable auctions [23]. By pursuing this
bidding strategy, the PA wins those types of servers which
are potentially profitable for the corresponding customer.
2) Obtaining the best price (price matching): There are
two modes of operation for any PA in an auction: participant
mode and observer mode. When a PA enters a CCN, he
becomes a participant and participates in the appropriate
active auctions. From the moment that the PA wins an
auction, he switches to the observer mode for that auction.
In this mode, the observer PA reduces the price of a won
server to a lower price using the following procedure:4
A) OBSAs with the first-price backbone: The observer
PA decreases his current payment to the winner’s bid if the
winner wins the auction with a lower price as compared to
the PA’s current payment. Otherwise, the observer PA does
not make any changes to his current payment. The price
matching process for the first-price OBSA is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
B) OBSAs with the second-price backbone: In this case,
each PA has an identity that gets updated whenever he
enters the market on behalf of a new customer. The winner
PA stores the identity of the PA who has proposed the
second highest bid, i.e., the so-called bumped PA. Possible
situations for the subsequent auction and the corresponding
actions of the observer PA’s are as follows:
B-1) The bumped PA wins the next auction: The
observer PA decreases his current payment to the second
highest bid of the next auction and updates his memory by
4. It is assumed that an observer PA knows the identity and the bid
of the winner PA and those of the PA with the second highest bid in
the observed auction.
5saving the identity of the PA who has proposed this bid.5
B-2) The bumped PA stays at the market but loses the
next auction: This implies that the winner’s bid is higher
than the current payment of the observer PA. This is due to
the fact that the true valuation of the bumped PA is time-
invariant and that truthfulness is a dominant strategy in the
second-price OBSAs [23]. In this case, the observer PA will
neither change its memory nor its current payment.
B-3) The bumped PA leaves the market: The observer
PA clears his memory and, from that point, he decreases his
current payment to each of the successive winner’s bid if
it is lower than its current payment (same as the first-price
backbone).6
The price matching process for the second-price OBSAs
is summarized in Algorithm 2.
3) Utilizing the won servers: At the end of the PA’s
patience time, among his obtained (won) servers, he chooses
those maximizing the corresponding customer’s utility.
Mathematically, the PA chooses a set of servers s∗ obtained
as s∗ = arg max
s⊆S
[v(s) − p(s)], where S denotes the won
servers by the PA during his patience time, and p(s), v(s)
denote the payment and the customer’s valuation corre-
sponding to the servers belonging to set s, respectively. All
the other acquired servers by this PA will be returned to the
CNN without any charge.
As can be observed, in OBSA, the winner determination
is very simple in both first- and second-price backbones
since the winner for each auction is always the PA with
the highest bid. Also, payment calculation is fairly simple
through observing the current winner bid. In contrast, com-
binatorial auction, proposed in contemporary cloud-related
literature (e.g., [20], [21]), requires solving the complex win-
ner determination process and calculating complex payment
functions for each PA.
4 ANALYSIS OF OBSAS
4.1 Backgrounds
The existence of the price matching process makes the
analysis of OBSAs completely different from that of classic
sequential auctions. In this section, mathematical analysis
of OBSAs is presented for both first-price and second-
price backbones. Without loss of generality, the analysis is
performed for an OBSA for one type of servers. It is assumed
that the ith PA’s bid (bi) takes a discrete value such that
bi ∈ [vmin, vmax], ∀i, where vmax − vmin = Kδ, K ∈ Z+,
and δ is the quantization size of the bids. In this case, vmin is
the CCN manager’s lowest affordable price (corresponding
to zero profit) and vmax could be an upper bound obtained
through market survey. Also, PAs’ bids are assumed to
be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) in each
auction. It is further assumed that the average number of
PAs in the market follows a Poisson distribution with mean
Φ, where, at each round of auction, Ω portion of them
5. This is due to the fact that if the observer PA would have post-
poned his entrance up to this auction, he would have to pay this price
for this server.
6. This is due to the fact that in this case, he could not have changed
the market with delaying his entrance, and he would have to pay this
price if he entered the market at the beginning of this auction.
participate in the auction. Hence, the number of PAs for each
auction follows a Poisson distribution with mean λ = ΩΦ.7
Our following analysis hold for an arbitrary distribution of
the PAs’ bids; however, specific bid distributions are needed
to obtain more concrete results for further insights. For this
purpose, two specific distributions for PAs’ bids that are
representative for a wide variety of markets are considered
below:
1) Uniform distribution: Bids are uniformly distributed
between [vmin, vmax] such that vmax−vminδ = Ku, where δ is
the quantization size of the bids. In this case, the length of
bid interval is vmax − vmin = δKu.
2) Sampled Laplace distribution: Bids are sampled from
a continuous Laplace distribution Laplace(µ,w), where the
µ and w are the so-called location and scale parameters,
respectively. In this case, the original continuous probability
density function (pdf) is given by f(x|µ,w) = 12we−
|x−µ|
w .
This continuous pdf is discretized with the step size δ such
that vmin = µ − KL1δ and vmax = µ + KL2δ, where
KL1 ,KL2 are positive integers. In this case, the length of
bid interval is vmax − vmin = (KL1 +KL2)δ.
We propose the sampled Laplace distribution to analyze
a market in which the bids are concentrated around a spe-
cific value and become less probable elsewhere. We formally
define this distribution and provide some related properties
below.
Definition 1. A random variable Y is defined as a concatenated
sampled (discretized) Laplace random variable on the inter-
val [a, b] with the sampling step size of δ ∈ Z > 1, and with the
location and scale parameters (µ,w) if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
• b−aδ = K , where K ∈ Z > 1.
• µ = a+ βδ, where β ∈ Z > 1.
• fY (a + k′δ) = pY (Y = a + k′δ) =
1
Γ(δ,K,β,w)
(
1
2we
− |a+k′δ−µ|w
)
, where k′ ∈ Z, 0 ≤ k′ ≤ K ,
and Γ(δ,K, β, w) is a normalization factor.
Lemma 1. The normalization parameter Γ(δ,K, β, w) of a
concatenated sampled (discretized) Laplace random variable with
specified parameters is given by:
Γ(δ,K, β, w) = 12we
− δβw 1−(e
δβ
w )
1−e δw
+ 12we
− δw 1−(e
− δ(K−β)
w )
1−e− δw
+ 12w . (1)
Proof. The proof can be carried out based on the fact that
sum of the fY (x) over all possible values of x is 1, i.e.,∑K
k′=0 fY (a+ k
′δ) = 1.
Fact 1. The cumulative distribution function (cdf) of a con-
catenated sampled (discretized) Laplace random variable on the
interval [a, b] with the sampling step size of δ ∈ Z > 1, and with
the location and scale parameters (µ,w) is given by:
FY (a+ kδ) = pY (y ≤ a+ kδ) =
7. This implies that the probability of having k PAs in an auction is
p(#PA = k) = e
−λλk
k!
.
6
0, if k < 0,
1
2wΓ(δ,K,β,w)e
a−µ
w
1−e
δ(k+1)
w
1−e δw
, if 0 ≤ k < β,
1
2wΓ(δ,K,β,w)
(
e
a−µ
w
1−e δβw
1−e δw
+ 1
)
, if k = β,
1
2wΓ(δ,K,β,w)
(
e
a−µ
w
1−e δβw
1−e δw
+ 1
+e−
δ
w
1−e−
δ(k−β)
w
1−e− δw
)
, if K ≥ k > β,
1, if k > K.
(2)
Proof. The cdf can be defined as follows:
pY (Y ≤ a+ kδ) =
k∑
k′=0
pY (Y = a+ k
′δ)
=
1
Γ(δ,K, β, w)
k∑
k′=0
1
2w
e−
|a+k′δ−µ|
w . (3)
Applying the result of Lemma 1 and some mathematical
manipulations give us the results above.
Remark: For a better illustration, some exemplary con-
catenated sampled Laplace distributions are depicted in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Concatenated sampled Laplace distributions on the
interval [0,50] with different parameters.
In the rest of this section, systematic analysis of the
price matching process of OBSAs is examined. We start by
presenting the analysis of the first-price OBSAs. Afterward,
the extension to the second-price OBSAs is presented.
4.2 First-price OBSAs
4.2.1 Modeling the price matching process
We model the price matching process of an observer PA
by a discrete time homogeneous Markov chain (DTHMC),
where the state space consists of the possible payments
of the PA. Initially, a winner PA enters into one of the
states depending on his current payment. Afterward, this
PA transits among different states of the DTHMC during his
observation time, where his current state always represents
his current payment during the price matching process.
At the end of his observation time window, he leaves the
DTHMC and makes a payment according to his last state.
To carry out the analysis, we define the residual patience time
∆ as the time duration in which the observer PA stays in the
proposed DTHMC (i.e., the length of the observation mode).
Figure 3 depicts the transition diagram of the proposed
DTHMC, where L = (vmax − vmin)/δ, pij denotes the
transition probability from state i to state j, and θj denotes
the stopping (leaving) probability for state j. The leaving prob-
abilities indicate quitting the price matching process upon
having zero residual patience time and making a payment
with respect to the last state. Also, pi0j denotes the entering
probability for state j. This parameter is defined based on
the probability of entering the DTHMC states for a winner
PA which depends on the initial bids. Considering a lower
bound on the bids reported by the CCN manager, all the
states of the DTHMC are transient except for the last state.
Also, due to the price matching process, only transitions to
lower prices (states with smaller indices) are possible.
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Figure 3: Transition diagram for the price matching process in
the first-price OBSA.
In the first-price OBSAs, for an observer PA with current
state (current payment) x, a transition to another state only
occurs when another PA wins the observed auction with
a bid less than x. Hence, transition probabilities for the
modeled DTHMC can be derived as follows:8
pxy =
∑∞
N=1 p (max(b1, · · · , bN ) = vmin + yδ) p(#PA = N)
, L ≥ x > y ≥ 0,
pkk =
∑∞
N=1 p (max(b1, · · · , bN ) ≥ vmin + kδ) p(#PA = N)
, L ≥ k ≥ 0,
(4)
(5)
whereN is the number of participant PAs in the auction. The
following expressions for the transition probabilities can be
derived readily.
• Uniform bids:
pxy =
∞∑
N=1
(y + 1)N − yN
(L+ 1)N
(
e−λλN
N !
)
= e−λ
[
e
(y+1)λ
L+1 − e yλL+1
]
.
(6)
• Concatenated sampled Laplace bids:
8. Note that all the derived transition probabilities and entering
probabilities depend on the number of available PAs in the market
which is a Poisson random variable as defined before.
7pxy =
∞∑
N=1
e−λλN
N !
(
1
2wΓ(δ,K, β, w)
)N
[(
y∑
k′=0
e−
|vmin+k′δ−µ|
w
)N
−
(
y−1∑
k′=0
e−
|vmin+k′δ−µ|
w
)N ]
= e−λ[e
λFY (vmin+yδ)
2wΓ(δ,K,β,w) − e
λFY (vmin+(y−1)δ)
2wΓ(δ,K,β,w) ]. (7)
This expression can be further expanded using (2).
The winner PA enters a state depending on his initial bid.
Therefore, the entering probabilities for the DTHMC can be
defined as:
pi0k = p (max(b1, · · · , bN ) = vmin + kδ) p(#PA = N)
= pxk, L ≥ x > k ≥ 0.
(8)
Using the transition probabilities, the one-step transition
matrix P = [pij ]0≤i,j≤L, which fully describes the charac-
teristics of the proposed DTHMC, can be readily built. Note
that P is a lower triangular matrix since the price matching
process only allows transitions toward lower states.
4.2.2 Expected income of the CCN manager in the first-
price OBSAs
One of the important performance metrics of any auction
is the auctioneer’s income or profit. The CCN manager’s
expected income is the same as the PAs’ expected pay-
ments. Due to the construction mechanism of our proposed
DTHMC, calculation of the leaving (stopping) probabilities
is the prerequisite for obtaining the expected PA’s payment.
Proposition 1. For an arbitrary observer PA with an arbitrary
residual patience time ∆, the conditional leaving probabilities
θij = p(Ending at j
th state given starting from the ith state) can
be obtained as follows:
θij = (P
∆)ij =
[ ∆∑
k=1
pijp
∆−k
jj p
k−1
ii
+
∆−2∑
k=0
∆−2−k∑
c=0
i−1∑
r=j+1
pirprjp
∆−k−2−c
jj p
k
i,ip
c
r,r + · · ·
]
,
(9)
where P∆ denotes the matrix P to the power of ∆.
Proof. The result of this proposition is based on the charac-
teristics of the one step transition matrix of a Markov chain.
Note that each of the terms in (9) corresponds to a different
scenario of transitions before leaving the DTHMC, and it
can be derived directly by inspecting Figure 3.
The following corollaries follow readily from the above
proposition.
Corollary 1. Considering the scenario described in Proposition 1,
the CCN manager’s expected revenue is given by:
E[Revenue] =
L∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
jθijpi
0
i =
L∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
j
(
P∆
)
ij
pi0i . (10)
When calculating the expected income, j should be replaced by
j + vmin in the above equation.
To avoid the burdensome of matrix multiplications
needed in the above corollary, lower bounds of the CCN
manager’s income can be used as explained in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. For the described scenario in Proposition 1, the
following expression can be obtained as a lower bound of the CCN
manager’s expected revenue:
E[Revenue] ≥∑Lj=0 pi0j p∆jj +∑Li=0∑ij=0 jpijp∆−1jj 1−
(
pii
pjj
)∆
1−
(
Pii
pjj
) pi0i . (11)
Also, obtaining better lower bounds by involving more higher-
order terms is straightforward.
4.3 Second-price OBSAs
4.3.1 Modeling the price matching process
Considering the price matching process of second-price
OBSAs presented in subsection 3.1, it can be seen that as
long as the bumped PA stays in the market, the observer
PA will only change his current payment when the bumped
PA wins one of the subsequent auctions. This is because
if the bumped PA stays in the market and does not win the
subsequent auctions, the winner PA’s bid will be higher than
the observer PA’s current payment. Nevertheless, when the
bumped PA leaves the market, the observer PA clears his
memory and adapts his payment to the winner PA’s bid at
each of the subsequent auctions.
Similar to the first-price OBSAs, Figure 4 depicts the
transition diagram of our proposed DTHMC correspond-
ing to the actions of an observer PA in the second-price
OBSAs. The transition diagram is composed of two main
components: a primary Markov chain and multiple sub-
Markov chains. The primary Markov chain describes the
case in which the bumped PA stays in the market, while
the sub-Markov chains capture the actions upon leaving the
bumped PA. Each subnm in Figure 4 refers to the case of
leaving from the mth state of the primary Markov chain and
entering a sub-Markov chain as depicted in Figure 3 with
an initial state n (pi0n = 1), with n ≤ m. This corresponds
to the case in which the current payment of the observer
PA is m and in the next auction the bumped PA leaves the
market and the observer PA’s current payment becomes n
with regard to the winner’s PA bid in the subsequent auc-
tion. Each vector Zm = [zm0, zm1, zmm, 0, · · · , 0] denotes a
(1× (L+ 1)) row vector, where the zmj is the probability of
leaving the primary Markov chain at state m and entering
the corresponding sub-Markov chain with starting state j
(pi0j = 1). Note that each departure branch denoted by
Zm, 0 ≤ m ≤ L, accounts for the m+ 1 possible transitions
to the sub-Markov chains, which are grouped in Figure 4
in the interest of space. In this diagram, qij denotes the
transition probability between state i and j, which occurs
when the bumped PA stays in the market and the observer
PA reduces its payment from (vmin + iδ) to the second
highest bid in the subsequent auction (vmin+jδ) (if it is less
than its current payment).9 It is assumed that the bumped
PA participates in the next auction with probability p(B),
which is modeled as a complementary cdf of a memoryless
9. In this case, to avoid confusion with the first-price OBSAs, the one-
step transition matrix for the primary Markov chain is denoted by Q.
8distribution (e.g., exponential distribution) for the ease of
analysis.10 According to the same logic used for deriving
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Figure 4: Transition diagram for the price matching process in
the second-price OBSAs.
the transition probabilities in the first-price OBSAs, we can
obtain the elements of vector Zx for state x as follows:
zxy =
∑∞
N=1
(
1− p(B))p (max(b1, · · · , bN ) = yδ + vmin)
p(#PA = N), L ≥ x > y ≥ 0,
zxx =
∑∞
N=1
(
1− p(B))p (max(b1, · · · , bN ) ≥ xδ + vmin)
p(#PA = N), L ≥ x ≥ 0.
(12)
(13)
Note that zxx corresponds to the situation in which the
bumped PA leaves the market but the winner PA’s bid at
the next auction is higher than the observer PA’s current
payment.
For the primary Markov chain, a transition between
states only occurs when the bumped PA stays in the mar-
ket. Hence, the elements of the transition matrix Q =
[qxy]0≤x,y≤L can be derived as follows:11
qxy =
∞∑
N=1
p(B)p
(
max(b1, · · · , b(N−1)) = yδ + vmin
)
p(#PA = N), L ≥ x > y ≥ 0,
qxx =
∞∑
N=1
p(B)p
(
max(b1, · · · , b(N−1)) ≥ xδ + vmin
)
p(#PA = N), L ≥ x ≥ 0.
(14)
(15)
Note that the expressions for zxy, qxy can be obtained
similarly as in (6),(7). Deriving the entering probabilities is
the same as obtaining the winner PAs’ payments distribu-
tion for a second-price auction. Mathematically,12
Π0k =
∑∞
N=2 p(#PA = N)
[
p
(
{∃! w ∈ {1, · · · , N}|bw > kδ + vmin}
, {max(bI) = kδ + vmin, I ∈ {1, · · · , N}/w}
)
+
∑N
m=2 p
({∃! E ⊂ {1, · · · , N}, |E| = m |∀e ∈ E be = kδ + vmin
,∀I ∈ {1, · · · , N}/E bI < kδ + vmin
})]
, L ≥ k ≥ 0, (16)
10. The memoryless property is considered so as to have a constant
probability of leaving for the bumped PA between consecutive auctions.
11. The result can be found by changing parameters in the derived
formula for z.
12. The symbol ∃! reads as: there is one and only one. Note that it is
assumed that at least two bidders participate in the market.
where the first term corresponds to the case in which there
is one and only one bid higher than vmin + kδ, while the
maximum of other bids is equal to vmin+kδ, and the second
term corresponds to the case in which there are at least two
bids equal to vmin+kδ while the others are less than vmin+
kδ. We obtain the closed-form expressions in this case as
follows:
• Uniform bids: (C(N,n) =
(N
n
)
)
Π0k =
∞∑
N=2
[
e−λλN
(N − 1)!
(
1−
(
k + 1
L+ 1
))
(
(k + 1)N−1 − kN−1
(L+ 1)N−1
)
+
e−λλN
N !
N∑
n=2
C(N,n)
(
1
L+ 1
)n ( k
L+ 1
)N−n ]
. (17)
• Concatenated sampled Laplace bids:
Π0k =
∞∑
N=2
[
(1− PB(b = vmin + kδ))(
(pB(b ≤ vmin + kδ))N−1−
(pB(b ≤ vmin + kδ − δ))N−1
) e−λλN
(N − 1)!
+
N∑
n=2
C(N,n) (pB(b = vmin + kδ))
n
(pB(b < vmin + kδ))
N−n
(
e−λλN
N !
)]
. (18)
Using (2), this expression can be further expanded.
4.3.2 Expected income of the CCN manager in the second-
price OBSAs
Similar to the derivations for the first-price OBSAs in sub-
section 4.2.2, the CCN manager’s expected income for the
second-price OBSAs can be derived as as follows.
Proposition 2. The CCN manager’s expected income in the
second-price OBSA when the observer PA’s residual patience time
is ∆ can be obtained as follows:
E[Revenue] =
L∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
jΘijΠ
0
i =
L∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
j
(
Q∆
)
ij
Π0i
+
∆∑
k=1
L∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
j
(
Q∆−kZP k−1
)
ij
Π0i . (19)
Note that using the defined Q, Z , P , the exact value of the CCN
manager’s expected income can be obtained. However, expanding
the Θij given in the following while neglecting the higher order
terms leads to an approximated lower bound of the CCN man-
ager’s income.
Θij = Pi(Ending at j
th state) =
[[ ∆∑
k=1
qijq
∆−k
jj q
k−1
ii
+
∆−2∑
k=0
∆−2−k∑
c=0
i−1∑
r=j+1
qirqrjq
∆−k−2−c
jj q
k
i,iq
c
r,r + · · ·
]
9+
[ ∆∑
k=1
zijp
∆−k
jj q
k−1
ii
+
∆−2∑
k=0
∆−2−k∑
c=0
i−1∑
r=j+1
qirzrjp
∆−k−2−c
jj q
k
i,iq
c
r,r + · · ·
]]
. (20)
4.4 The Allowable Patience Time of the PAs in OBSAs
This subsection is devoted to finding the relationship be-
tween the PAs’ patience time and the CCN manager’s profit.
As can be seen from Figure 3, all the states of the proposed
DTHMC are transient except the last state in the first-price
OBSAs. This fact implies that the corresponding steady
state distribution takes the value of one only at the last
state and zero everywhere else. Hence, if the PAs’ patience
time is sufficiently large, they usually (in the mean sense)
pay the CCN manager an amount close to vmin, which is
not profitable for the CCN manager. Considering this fact,
imposing some constraints on the PAs’ patience time is
necessary.
Let (X)n≥0 be a DTHMC with state space S. The hitting
time for an arbitrary state a ∈ S is defined as a random
variable Ha = inf{n ≥ 0 : Xn = a}. Subsequently, the mean
hitting time of an arbitrary state a given an starting state i
can be expressed as kai = E(H
a|X0 = i). By inspecting the
transition diagram in Figure 3, the mean hitting times for
state 0 can be derived as [29]: k00 = 0, k
0
1 = 1 + p10k
0
0 +
p11k
0
1, k
0
2 = 1 + p20k
0
0 + p21k
0
1 + p22k
0
2, · · · , which can be
written in a compact matrix form as follows:
1 0 0 0 · · · 0
−p10 1− p11 0 0 · · · 0
−p20 −p21 1− p22 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
−pL,0 −pL,1 −pL,2 · · · −pL,L−1 1− pLL


k00
k01
k02
...
k0L
 =

0
1
1
...
1
. (21)
Similarly, the following equation holds for the second-price
OBSAs depicted in Figure 4.

1 0 0 0 · · · 0
−q10 1− q11 0 0 · · · 0
−q20 −q21 1− q22 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
−qL,0 −qL,1 −qL,2 · · · −qL,L−1 1− qLL


ρ00
ρ01
ρ02
...
ρ0L
+

−z00 0 0 0 · · · 0
−z10 −z11 0 0 · · · 0
−z20 −z21 −z22 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
−zL,0 −zL,1 −zL,2 · · · −zL,L−1 −zLL


k00
k01
k02
...
k0L
 =

0
1
1
...
1
,
(22)
where ρ0i is the mean hitting time in the primary Markov
chain. Using the mean hitting times for state 0, for the
second-price OBSAs, the expected absorption time P 0 to
this state is given by:
P 0 =
L∑
i=0
Π0i ρ
0
i . (23)
In a similar fashion, for the first-price OBSAs, solving (21)
along with using the vector pi0 provides the expected ab-
sorption time to state 0. This parameter (P 0) can be used
for setting an upper bound on the PAs’ patience time. For
instance, if the average patience time ∆¯ of the PAs is greater
than or equal to P 0, the CCN manager makes a low long-
term profit. Hence, a CCN manager can set tighter bounds
on the PAs’ average patience time or the PAs’ maximum
patience time ∆max, e.g., ∆max ≤ P 0m ,m ∈ Z > 1, to
guarantee a higher profit.
In the above derivations, the focus is on the absorption
to state 0 which implies no profit for the CCN manager.
However, with the same logic and the same procedure, one
can derive similar equations for hitting the other states (such
as state 1 or 2) to set tighter upper bounds on the CCN
manager’s profit.
5 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CCN MANAGERS AND
CPS
In this section, we analyze the interactions between the CCN
managers and the CPs. We consider a market in which CCN
managers are the buyers and CPs are the sellers. The CCN
managers compete to acquire resources from the CPs to
fulfill their demands and attract more customers. This is a
dynamic market in the sense that both of the CCN managers
and the CPs can leave and join the market over time.
For each type of servers, we divide the market into two
sub-markets: flat-price market and auction-based market.
In the flat-price market, resources are sold with a con-
stant price. In the auction-based market, resources are sold
through auctions. Consequently, each CCN manager has
two options to obtain extra resources: (i) to buy the resources
with a unit flat-price; (ii) to participate in the auctions.
Correspondingly, the CPs have two options to sell their
extra resources. In the rest of the discussion, without loss
of generality, we focus on one type of servers.
It is assumed that auctions are held with a Poisson rate
λA, and the number of CCN managers available in the
market during each round of auction is Poisson distributed
with mean λCCN . In each auction, a portion of the CCN
managers act as active bidders and participate in the auc-
tion, while the rest act as passive participants and do not
submit their bids; the fraction of active CCN managers is
denoted by µ. Moreover, we assume that the number of CPs
participating in each round of the auction follows Poisson
distribution with mean λCP . The time window in which a
CCN manager can stay in the auction market (participation
time) is limited to Tp. When the participation time of a CCN
manager ends, he has to obtain the resources through the
flat-price market with price $.
In each auction, interested CCN managers participate
with their bids reflecting their valuations for the servers, and
CPs participate with their offered prices determining their
least expected prices to lend their resources. The winner of
each auction is the CCN manager who offers the highest
bid, and he receives the resources from the CP with the
lowest offered price. This happens if the lowest offered price
is less than the winner’s bid. Otherwise, there is no winner
in the auction. As can be seen, two competitions emerge
in this market: (i) the competition between CCN managers
who try to offer higher prices to win the resources; (ii) the
competition between CPs who try to offer lower prices to
sell their resources. For the rest of this study, we focus on the
CCN managers’ competition since the competition among
the CPs can be similarly analyzed.
Consider one of the CCN managers with r units of
residual participation time. Similar to [30], aggressive bid-
ding strategy is considered, where the CCN managers bid
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more values as they approach the deadline. In this case, the
instantaneous bid of a CCN manager can be modeled as
follows:
b(r) = e−γru−D(r), (24)
where u stands for the instant utility gained from the
resource, γ the CCN manager’s rate of time preference, and
D(r) the discounted expected utility. More precisely, D(r)
determines the cost of neglecting the potential future dis-
counts by waiting in the auction. Note that b(r) should
be a decreasing function with respect to r since the CCN
manager bids higher as he approaches the deadline.
When a CCN manager’s participation time ends, he
has to leave the auction and pay the constant price $
for the resource. This fact implies the following boundary
conditions:
b(0) = $,
D(0) = u−$. (25)
It is assumed that the CCN managers’ bids and the CP’s
offered prices are kept private. Hence, the CCN managers
have no knowledge about the bids of each other. Nonethe-
less, the following information is assumed known to the
CCN managers: (i) the cdf F (b) and thus the pdf f(b) of
the bids; (ii) the cdf G(o) and thus the pdf g(o) of the CPs’
offered prices.
As mentioned before, there are two well-known mecha-
nisms for determining the winner’s payment in the auction,
first-price and second-price mechanisms. In-depth analysis
of the both mechanisms in the described markets is pre-
sented below.13
5.1 First-price Analysis
In the first-price payment scheme, the winner CCN manager
has to pay the value of his bid to the seller CP. In the
following theorem, we obtain the bidding strategy of a CCN
manager in a stable market setting where the distributions
of the bids and offered prices are stationary.
Theorem 1. For the described market, with the first-price pay-
ment mechanism, a CCN manager’s expected utility can be
described using the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation:
D(r) = (u−$)e−γr. (26)
In this case, the bid of a CCN manager with the residual time r in
the stable market setting is given by:
b∗(r) = $e−γr. (27)
Proof. Consider a short period of time δ where the prob-
ability of an auction occurring during the period can be
expressed as δµλA < 1. The expected utility of a CCN
13. A simplified version of our analysis is presented in [30] for a retail
market, where the focus is on the second-price payment mechanism. In
their model, the offered prices of the sellers are not incorporated into
the analysis which simplifies their model and derivations.
manager with residual waiting time r is given by:
D(r) =
1
1 + γδ
[
(
1− µλAδ
∞∑
n=0
e−λCCNλnCCN
n!
Fn(b(r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
∞∑
n=1
e−λCP λnCP
n!
(1−Gn(b(r)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
)
D(r − δ)
+µλAδ
([ ∞∑
n=0
e−λCCNλnCCN
n!
Fn(b(r))
∞∑
n=1
e−λCP λnCP
n!
(1−Gn(b(r)))
] (
e−γru
)
−
[ ∞∑
n=0
e−λCCNλnCCN
n!
Fn(b(r))
∞∑
n=1
e−λCP λnCP
n!
(1−Gn(b(r)))
]
b(r)
)]
,
(28)
where the factor 1 + γδ is the interest of time of the CCN
manager. In the above equation, the second and the third
lines correspond to the situation in which the CCN manager
does not obtain the resource in the current period, and thus
he bids in the next time period. The term (a) indicates
the probability of winning of a CCN manager when he
faces n opponents in the auction. The term (b) indicates
encountering at least a CP with a lower offered price than
the current bid of the CCN manager. The rest of the equation
describes the situation in which the CCN manager wins the
auction in the current period. In this case, there would be
a change in the utility, described by the fourth and the fifth
lines, and an incurred payment which is described in the
last two lines. The terms (a) and (b) can be simplified as
follows:
∞∑
n=0
e−λCCNλnCCN
n!
Fn (b(r)) = eλCCN (F (b(r))−1), (29)
∞∑
n=1
e−λCP λnCP
n!
(1−Gn(b(r)) = 1− eλCP (G(b(r))−1). (30)
Using the above expressions and applying some algebraic
manipulations, (28) can be rewritten as:
γD(r) =
D(r − δ)−D(r)
δ
+ µλA(
eλCCN (F (b(r))−1)
(
1− eλCP (G(b(r))−1)
)
(−D(r − δ) + e−γru− b(r))).
(31)
The result of the theorem can be obtained by letting δ → 0
and applying the boundary conditions given in (25).
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5.2 Second-price Analysis
In the second-price mechanism, the winner CCN manager
has to pay the second highest bid to the seller CP. To obtain
the CCN managers’ bidding strategy in the stable market
setting, we first derive the HJB equation for this case in the
following theorem. Then, we propose a method to solve the
derived HJB equation in the following corollaries.
Theorem 2. For the described market with the second-price
payment mechanism, in the stable market setting, a CCN man-
ager’s expected utility can be described using the following HJB
equation:
γD(r) = −D′(r) + µλA(
eλCCN (F (b(r))−1)
(
1− eλCP (G(b(r))−1)
)
(
e−γru−D(r))− (1− eλCP (G(b(r))−1))[
e−λCCN b(T ) +
∫ b(r)
b(T )
λCCN
eλCCN (F (b(t))−1)b(t)F ′(b(t))d(b(t))
])
.
(32)
Proof. We can follow the procedure described in the proof
of Theorem 1 while changing the expected payment term in
the derivations. In the second-price payment mechanism, a
CCN manager’s expected payment can be expressed as:(
1− eλCP (G(b(r))−1)
) [
e−λCCN b(T )+
∞∑
n=1
e−λCCNλnCCN
n!
∫ b(r)
b(T )
b(t)nFn−1(b(t))F ′(b(t))dt
]
, (33)
where the first term expresses the probability of encounter-
ing at least one CP with a lower offered price compared to
the CCN manager’s bid, and the terms inside the bracket
indicate the expected payment of the CCN manager upon
encountering no opponent (the first term) or at least one
opponent (the second term). Note that nFn−1(b(t))F ′(b(t))
is the pdf of the second highest bid in an auction. In this
case, the expected utility can be derived as follows:
γD(r) =
D(r − δ)−D(r)
δ
+ µλA[
eλCCN (F (b(r))−1)
(
1− eλCP (G(b(r))−1)
)
(−D(r − δ) + e−γru)
−
(
1− eλCP (G(b(r))−1)
)
[
e−λCCN b(T ) +
∫ b(r)
b(T )
λCCN
eλCCN (F (b(t))−1)b(t)F ′(b(t))d(b(t))
]]
.
(34)
The result of the theorem can be obtained by letting δ → 0.
Corollary 3. The bid of a CCN manager with the residual
participation time r, in the second-price payment mechanism, can
be described by the following integro-differential equation:
b∗(r)
[
− γ − µλA
(
eλCCN (F (b
∗(r))−1)
)
(
1− eλCP (G(b∗(r))−1)
) ]
− b∗
′
(r)
+µλAλCCN
(
1− eλCP (G(b∗(r))−1)
)
∫ b∗(r)
b∗(T )
eλCCN (F (b(t))−1)b(t)F ′ (b(t)) d(b(t))
+µλA
(
1− eλCP (G(b∗(r))−1)
)
e−λCCN b∗(T )
−γue−γr = 0.
(35)
Considering the boundary conditions given in (25), one can
numerically solve the above equation so as to find the optimal
bidding strategy at each time instant.
Proof. Replacing D(r) and D′(r) in (32) with (24) yields:
γ
(
e−γru− b(r)) = (b′(r) + γe−γru)+ µλA[
eλCCN (F (b(r))−1)
(
1− eλCP (G(b(r))−1)
)
b(r)
−
(
1− eλCP (G(b(r))−1)
) [
e−λCCN b(T )+∫ b(r)
b(T )
λCCNe
λCCN (F (b(t))−1)b(t)F ′(b(t))d(b(t))
]]
.
(36)
By rearranging the terms, one can obtain (35).
Note that no assumption is made on the pdf and cdf of
the bids and offered prices in the above derivations and the
corresponding results hold for any arbitrary distribution.
In the following, by assuming a specific cdf and pdf for
these quantities, we explicitly derive the bidding strategy of
a CCN manager as a first-order differential equation.
Corollary 4. Consider a market in which higher bids and offered
prices happen with low probabilities. More precisely, assume that
the pdfs of bids and offered prices measured at each value x are
both inversely proportional to x. In this case, the pdf and cdf of
the bids and the offered prices can be described as follows:
g(b(r)) = f(b(r)) =
1
b(r)[ln(z)− ln(a)] ,
G(b(r)) = F (b(r)) =
ln(b(r))− ln(a)
ln(z)− ln(a) ,
b(r) ∈ [a, z], 0 < a < z < $.
(37)
If the initial CCN manager’s bid is small such that b(T ) → a,
where a → 0, then the bidding strategy of a CCN manager, with
residual patience time r, is dictated by the following first-order
differential equation:
y′(r) + c1(y(r))c2 + c3(y(r))c4 + c5(y(r))c6 + c7y(r)
= −γue−γr, (38)
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where y(r) = b∗(r), and
c1 =− µλAe−λCCN e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a) e−λCP e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q)
+ µλAλCCNe
−λCP e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q)
e−λCCN e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a)
(
1
λCCN + ln(z)− ln(a)
)
,
c2 =
λCCN
ln(z)− ln(a) +
λCP
ln(z)− ln(q) + 1,
c3 =− γe−λCP e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q) ,
c4 =
λCP
ln(z)− ln(q) + 1,
c5 =µλAe
−λCCN e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a) ,
+ µλAλCCNe
−λCCN e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a)
c6 =
λCCN
ln(z)− ln(a) + 1,
c7 =γ.
(39)
Proof. Considering the given expressions for the cdf and pdf
of bids and offered prices, (35) can be rewritten as:
b(r)
[
− γ − µλAe−λCCN e
λCCN ln(b(r))
ln(z)−ln(a) e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a)
(
1− e−λCP e
λCP ln(b(r))
ln(z)−ln(q) e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q)
)]
− b′(r)
+ µλAλCCN
(
1− e−λCP e
λCP ln(b(r))
ln(z)−ln(q) e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q)
)
(∫ b(r)
b(T )
e−λCCN e
λCCN ln(b(t))
ln(z)−ln(a) e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a)
1
ln(z)− ln(a)d(b(t))
)
+ µλA
(
1− e−λCP e
λCP ln(b(r))
ln(z)−ln(q) e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q)
)
e−λCCN b(T )− γue−γr = 0.
(40)
Performing some algebraic manipulations and taking the
integral and then rearranging the terms yields:
−γ(b(r)) + γe−λCP e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q) (b(r))
λCP
ln(z)−ln(q) +1
−µλAe−λCCN e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a) (b(r))
λCCN
ln(z)−ln(a) +1
+µλAe
−λCCN e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a) e−λCP e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q)
(b(r))
λCCN
ln(z)−ln(a) +
λCP
ln(z)−ln(q) +1 − b′(r)
+µλAλCCNe
−λCCN e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a)
(b(r))
λCCN
ln(z)−ln(a) +1
(
1
λCCN + ln(z)− ln(a)
)
−µλAλCCNe−λCP e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q)
(b(r))
λCP
ln(z)−ln(a) e−λCCN e
−λCCN ln(a)
ln(z)−ln(a)(
1
λCCN + ln(z)− ln(a)
)
(b(r))
λCCN
ln(z)−ln(a) +1
+µλA − µλAe−λCP e
−λCP ln(q)
ln(z)−ln(q) (b(r))
λCP
ln(z)−ln(q)
e−λCCN b(T )− γue−γr = 0.
(41)
This can be expressed by (38)-(39).
6 SIMULATION RESULTS
The performance of the proposed scheme is illustrated
through four simulation scenarios.
6.1 Scenario 1: CCN Managers’ Income in OBSAs
We consider the market described in Table 1, where the
bids’ range is adopted from the history of winners’ bid of
Amazon’s memory optimized instance (x1.32xlarge) in the
past three month [31]. The minimum (maximum) value of
bids corresponds to the 50% of the minimum winner bid
(maximum winner bid) in that dataset upon requesting the
cloud instance for 24 hours.14 The presented analytic results
for the CCN manager’s income in Section 4 and the results
obtained from 10000 Monte Carlo simulations are depicted
in Figure 5. It can be seen that the analytic results and
the simulation results agree well with each other. Also it
can be observed that the CCN manager’s income becomes
less sensitive to the number of PAs after the market gets
sufficiently crowded. Moreover, the effect of increasing the
patience time on the CCN manager’s income becomes more
pronounced when there are fewer participant PAs.
Auction mechanism Bids’ Range Distribution Parameters
Fist-price
Second-price [48,312]
Uniform
Sampled Laplace
-
µ = 70, δ = 1, w = 50
Table 1: Simulation setting for the dynamic market between the
PAs and the CCN managers.
6.2 Scenario 2: Bids of CCN Managers
To demonstrate the CCN managers’ bidding behavior in our
proposed model, we simulate the result of Corollary 4. For
this purpose, a market with the parameters described in
Table 2 is considered. As before, considering the pricing
history of Amazon’s memory optimized instance in the
past three month [31], the value of z is obtained assuming
the maximum bid of a CCN for the cloud resources to be
one-third of its maximum sold price. Due to the lack of a
real dataset, the rest of the parameters are chosen based
on common sense. Figure 6 depicts the value of the CCN
managers’ bids over time for various values of γ. As can be
seen, as the value of γ increases, the CCN managers lose
their interest in buying resources faster and bidding higher
values.
Parameter u µ λA λCCN λCP z a
Value 5 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.75 104 0.01
Table 2: Simulation setting for the dynamic market between the
CCN managers and the CPs.
6.3 Scenario 3: Selling the Cloud Resources
In Figure 7, the improvement that can be obtained using the
OBSAs instead of the sequential combinatorial auctions is
shown in terms of the total number of winners and total sold
cloud servers. Also, Figure 8 reveals the corresponding CCN
14. In the second-price case, the bumped PA is assumed to participate
in the next auction with the probability p(B) = 0.5.
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manager’s income. For this simulation, 10 types of servers
are considered where the CCN manager holds 1000 auctions
for each of these types synchronously at every minute,
where the total number of needed types of servers for
each PA is uniformly distributed in the interval [1, 10]. The
arrival rates (per minuet) for servers are i.i.d and uniformly
distributed in the interval [1/15, 1]. This interval is derived
based on the reported data in [32], which indicates that
the majority of task executions are under 15 minutes. It is
assumed that customers do not leave the market without
obtaining their demanded resources (long patience time).
The results in Figures 7, 8 indicate an increase in the cus-
tomers’ satisfaction, utilization of resources, and the CCN
manager’s income upon using the OBSAs.
6.4 Scenario 4: Market Stability
Figure 9 compares the variance of the winners’ payment
for the second-price OBSA described in Scenario 1 and that
of the sequential combinatorial auction for various number
of PAs (N ) and different residual patience times (∆). Less
variance for the payments in the former is seen in Figure 9
implying a more predictable market for the CCN manager.
Also, similar results are observed for the first-price OBSAs,
which are omitted for the interest of space.
Figure 10 depicts the number of participant PAs in the
second-price OBSA and that in the sequential combinatorial
auction. In this scenario, at each time instant one auction
occurs, where the number of available PAs at each time
instant is assumed to be a Poisson random variable with
mean 93. This value is adopted from [32] assuming that
10% of all the PAs participate in each round of auction.
Each PA can delay his participation. It is assumed that 20%
of these PAs have side information about the future market
situation. It is assumed that the market receives the lowest
bids from participant PAs in every 10 time instances. As
can be seen, by utilizing sequential combinatorial auctions,
those informed PAs delay their entrance into the market,
leading to an unfavorable burst of arrival. In contrast, this
issue is effectively suppressed by the proposed OBSAs.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we proposed a comprehensive two stage
framework to describe resource allocation and gathering
in modern cloud networks. The first stage describes the
interactions between the PAs and the CCN managers. For
this stage, OBSAs along with their theoretical analysis are
proposed, which enjoy a simple winner determination pro-
cess and provide the truthfulness property. The second stage
models the interactions between the CCN managers and
the CPs. For this stage, a theoretical framework is devel-
oped to model the bidding behavior of the CCN managers.
For future work, one worthwhile direction is to explore
the optimization of the social welfare or other parameters
of interest. Studying the resource allocation and the load
balancing problems jointly is also interesting. In this case, a
CCN manager should consider the geographical locations of
the servers and CPs to find the optimal resource allocation.
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Figure 5: Analytic results (AR) and sim-
ulation results (SR) for the CCN man-
ager’s income in the first- and second-
price OBSAs for various number of
PAs (N) and different residual patience
times (∆).
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Figure 6: The CCN managers’ bids with
respect to the residual waiting time for
different rates of time preference.
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